As many speculate over the future of Syria, filmmaker Suhaib Abu Doulah explores its turbulent past. From the days of the United Arab Republic to the military coup that elevated Hafez Al-Assad to the Presidency, this documentary provides a deeper look at the political culture and past experiences that have shaped a divided nation.

Four years have passed and a lot has changed for Barack Obama. This time around the gloss and glamour of his 2008 campaign seem absent as he tries to convince the American public to let him finish the job he started.

Obama’s first term was spent repairing and steadying a country battered by the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. The lofty goals of “change” referenced across his speeches had to be shelved for prudence. And while many adjectives can be found to describe Obama’s term report card, few would argue that the situation has not improved. In fact, many supporters cite the hand Obama was dealt as a key ingredient in killing the enthusiasm that swept the nation four years ago, a hand that was dealt by the policies of a Republican administration; one not dissimilar to the man standing opposite Obama.

In the Red Corner…

Mitt Romney’s successful nomination was greeted by excitement from the Obama camp. The Republican race was both long and gruelling and Obama gathered plenty of inspiration from the many Republicans who sat uneasy with Romney. Despite the regular reference to a cardboard cut-out, the former Michigan governor comes across in a variety of suits. To many he is the serial “flip-flopper,” the million dollar man so out of touch with middle-class America or the quiet Mormon who doesn’t want to share his magic laundry. Few seem impressed by him and he has done nothing to convert the masses or excite the base.

His vision and plan lacks substance and seem to change when the need arises. A major part of this election involves the economy, jobs and of-course, taxes. Romney’s tax plan is not bad; it has to work to even be considered that.  The Non-partisan Tax policy Centre ran tests that concluded that even under the most favourable conditions – and they tried a few – Romney’s plan fails to add up. His tax cuts for the rich, greater than the (non investment) deductions they already have, would increase the tax burden on the already struggling middle-class. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the plan would need to cut all non-defence, non-Social Security programs by 49 percent, a move that seems highly unlikely if not apocalyptic.

It doesn’t get any better when it comes to Romney’s other plans, which lack excitement and detail. He proposes using the same five point plan McCain and Bush championed. Where’s the progress Mitt?  Cut taxes, reduce spending, more free trade, more American energy (drill baby drill) and more forms of education; the Republican Party keeps feeding the same old jargon every term. In many ways, this isn’t an election, it is a sales pitch and Mitt Romney is quite the salesmen too; he has to be if  he is going to sell his other four-year plans.

When it comes to healthcare, America has a choice of liking Obama’s Affordable Care Act – similar to the one Romney implemented as governor – or the pre-existing conditions coverage proposed by Romney. Coupled with his vision for taxation, middle-class Americans in need of medical aid will be hard pressed to vote for Romney; you’ll be paying more taxes and getting nothing. And I do mean nothing; especially after Romney’s ridiculous budget cuts add further strain on a number of benefits.

Romney is aligned with most fellow Republicans who think Global Warming is a fad, an opinion that is quickly falling behind in opinion polls across the country. In fact, he plans cuts for wind and other renewable energy projects that will keep the United States – that old bastion of science and technology – firmly in the Stone Age; all the while taunting and lying about Obama’s various Green initiatives.

“Stay the course” or “Back to the Future”

Then comes the simple question of integrity, where the consensus on both sides paint Romney as a flip-flopper; even a liar. The American public has seen Romney change sides so many times that they don’t know where he really stands. It causes frustration within his own party, but also a ray of hope with the knowledge that Romney would jump on any bandwagon given the right circumstances. His image is no better on the International circuit, another arena where Obama’s has had plenty of repair work. Some see Romney as a doorman for the Neo-cons to get back into the White House, a proposition not looked upon fondly by the outside world. However, a few less threatening perceptions of Romney were formed by his blunder-filled foreign visits in Europe.

Say what you will about President Obama, but albeit problems like Guantanamo, he has stuck to some significant promises. He has pulled out of Iraq and killed Osama Bin Laden while steadying the largest economy in the world. Obama and the Democratic Party have shown a desire for change but are not without their own flaws; still, they are moving in the right direction. Sadly the Republicans have fallen behind, resorting to voter suppression and Stone Age policies to fix modern problems. Obama may not be the rock star of 2008 but he is the man who can be trusted to take America forward.

Dinesh Swaminathan is an undergraduate at the University of Guelph and has a keen interests in US and UK politics.

On the 19th of October 2012, a car bomb explosion in East Beirut killed Police Information Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Wissam al-Hassan with 2 other people. The assassination came as a surprise to many. The person in charge of the most powerful security apparatus in Lebanon is dead, who else is safe?

In the deeply divided country, accusations following every assassination are always ready. March 14 Alliance accuses Syria; while March 8 alliance accuses Israel, and the latter accuses Hezbollah.  In this particular assassination however, pointing fingers is not as easy due to Al-Hassan’s enigmatic personality. The only absentee on the day of Rafiq Hariri’s assassination and the mastermind behind many successful security operations, al-Hassan has earned the title of Lebanon’s most skilled security official.

While intelligence officers around the world veer away from politics, in a country as politicized and sectarianized as Lebanon, this is considered a sin. Al-Hassan understood that very well. Although he sided with the Future Movement, the largest constituent of March 14 alliances, he kept channels of communications open with its rivals.

As the divide in the country between political parties grew wider after 2005, al-Hassan played the attaché role between March 14 and March 8 alliances. He coordinated with Hezbollah on internal and external security matters. Furthermore, al-Hassan took credit for dismantling many Israeli espionage networks (More than 30 according to Future Movement sources). Using advanced telecommunication and interception technologies presented by western countries to help with Hariri assassination investigation, the information branch and the military intelligence arrested more than 40 people in the past 7 years, some of which were high ranked army officials and politicians.

Furthermore, al-Hassan orchestrated Saad Hariri’s visit to Damascus in 2009 after a 4 years long and hostile relationship where Hariri accused the Syrian regime of assassinating his father. Prior to that, al-Hassan was behind Hariri’s acknowledgement of the presence of false witnesses in his father’s assassination investigation, which led to pointing fingers to Syria between years 2005 and 2009.

On the other hand, al-Hassan himself was accused of fabricating false witnesses in the Hariri case. He was caught on tape helping one of the witnesses, Muhammad Zuhair Al-Siddiq, present a coherent testimony to the investigators, in the presence of Saad Hariri.  It is also believed that he helped provide the special tribunal of Lebanon with evidence that implicates four Hezbollah members in the Hariri assassination.

Very recently, al-Hassan took once again the centre stage in the ever eventful country; his branch arrested Michel Samaha, a pro-Syrian Lebanese politician, in charges of plotting a terrorist attack. Last but not least, al-Hassan has recently been accused of helping the Syrian opposition through facilitating the flow of arms from the north of the country to bordering Syrian cities.

The questions that arise after each crime are who did it? What are the motives? And who benefits from it? In Post-Syria Lebanon these questions often remained unanswered subsequently to assassinations of such nature. Investigations usually faced political and logistical difficulties that often directed that often led to dead ends. In the case of al-Hassan, the man with many “friends”, the complexity is doubled. March 14 alliance accused Syria, just hours after the explosion, a practice used intermittently since 2005. Israel and some western countries are pointing fingers to Hezbollah, and finally March 8 alliance is pointing fingers to Israel.

The assassination of such controversial figure requires calm and deep analysis that takes in consideration the political context in Lebanon and the region. The man was involved in both the intelligence and political realms. Although he was close to March 14th he never severed relations with March 8. He coordinated with intelligence from over 34 countries in the assassinations that have been taking place ever since 2005. At the same time, he held a public office where he had the responsibility of keeping internal security.

A portfolio like this will earn you more enemies than friends. The question becomes: who of al-Hassan’s foes found it beneficial to get rid of him in the present time? I will go through the three main suspects that are directly accused of this act: the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, and Israel; all of which have capabilities to do it, but in different capacities.  Assuming that the side that planned the act is a rational actor, an assessment of the motives, momentum, and a brief cost/benefit analysis of each suspect can help draw a better image.

The Syrian regime 

Motives: Syria was blamed for all the assassinations targeting March 14th figures in Lebanon ever since 2004. In al-Hassan’s case, the accusation becomes more plausible since his bureau recently arrested one of the Syrian regime affluent allies in Lebanon in charges of terrorism. Moreover, Saad Hariri is openly supporting the Syrian opposition, and al-Hassan is believed to play an important role in that. The Syrian regime has all the motives to eliminate al-Hassan.

Momentum: The latest Samaha case and the support for the Syrian uprising have pushed al-Hassan into the spotlight as a serious contender of the Syrian regime. Not surprisingly, a Brigade of the Free Syrian army has been named after al-Hassan shortly after his assassination. High exposure usually deters antagonists to attack since they will be the first to be accused – assuming that we are dealing with a rational actor.

Cost/Benefit: Politically speaking, the Syrian regime’s survival of the uprising for more than a year and a half now, have put him in a relatively stronger position compared to his foes. Any error on the part of the regime is exploited ruthlessly by its opponents, inside and outside the country. It helps mount pressures and embarrass the regime’s international and regional allies in the United Nations. With Lakhdar Brahimi’s mission underway (presently trying to bring both conflicting parties to commit to a cease-fire), and the Turks and the West showing weak signs of regression, it is unlikely to see Assad giving a pro bono for his contenders. Eliminating al-Hassan is unlikely to stop the flow of arms to the Syrian opposition from Lebanon. While the regime has shown an uncontestable brutality, it has also shown that it is a self-interested rational actor, looking for survival. In al-Hassan’s case, while revenge is tempting for Assad’s regime, the costs simply outweigh the benefits for the Syrian regime at the present time.

Israel

Motives: Keeping in mind al-Hassan’ role in uncovering Israeli espionage networks, Israeli motives are not linked directly to al-Hassan himself, but rather to his statue in the Lebanese political scene. Israel’s main adversary in Lebanon is Hezbollah. Around 10 days ago, the Party of God flew a reconnaissance drone for hours over strategic Israeli sites, including the Dimona nuclear reactor in the Negev desert. This in itself have undermined years of hard work put in the construction of the iron dome, a rocket and missile defense system that was officially launched in 2011. It has also ridiculed claims of military supremacy of a country that has been banging the drums of war for some time now against a more powerful opponent than Hezbollah, Iran. Defiance as dangerous as this one cannot go unanswered, but at the same time it has to be measured enough to avoid slipping into an unpredictable regional war.

Momentum: Following al-Hassan’s arrest of a Lebanese pro-Syrian politician, his assassination will automatically draw attention to Syria and Hezbollah as the culprits. It will serve as an immediate deterrence coded message from the Israelis to Hezbollah in response to the latter’s daring and recent drone operation. Finally, it will add to the case against Hezbollah recently being carried out in the international justice system.

Cost/Benefit: The breach of the Ayoub drone is unparalleled in the ongoing cold war between Israel and Hezbollah ever since 2006. Israel is currently unable to respond with a direct military strike, in fear of the implications of such step: a regional war that Israel doesn’t seem ready for. However, the Israelis are not used to let such defiance go unanswered, the 2006 Lebanon war and the 2008 Gaza war are reminders of such reality. What is the best scenario to retaliate and mount pressure on Hezbollah and its allies without slipping into an unpredictable regional war? Experience has shown that Hezbollah’s biggest fear is an internal sectarian civil war that will drain its military wing. While sectarian polarization between Sunnis and Shiites has been building up for a while now in Lebanon and the region, the right trigger can lead to an explosion that will primarily burn Hezbollah. The prominent Sunni official, the dove in March 14 alliance and the main contender of the Syrian regime and Hezbollah, al-Hassan constitutes the perfect subject for the set objective.

Hezbollah

Motives: Al-Hassan helped implicate Hezbollah members in the Rafiq Hariri’s assassination investigation. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has already requested the arrest of four Hezbollah members. Moreover, al-Hassan’s alleged role in supporting the Syrian opposition against the Syrian regime, a strong ally of Hezbollah, puts him automatically at odds with Hezbollah.

Momentum: The assassination will incite sectarian tensions and has already done so. This automatically reflects negatively on Hezbollah. Internal instability has never been a helpful factor for the party. Moreover, Hezbollah has just flown an unmanned drone into Israel. The significance and the importance of such event are overshadowed by al-Hassan’s assassination; taking away of the media impact that Hezbollah always tend to get for any “surprise” related to the conflict with Israel.

Cost/Benefit: The involvement of different Lebanese forces in the Syrian conflict is no longer a secret. The North of Lebanon and parts of the Bekaa valley are dominated by supporters of the Free Syrian Army, and Lebanese politicians are facilitating access to resources for both parties. Neither Hezbollah nor al-Hassan can single handedly change this reality. March 14 politicians are openly against the Syrian regime; al-Hassan might be one of the doves in this group. Furthermore, the damage of the tribunal is already done and the Hezbollah suspects have already been summoned. The complex Lebanese politics will probably never see a definitive end to this story and the suspects will never be handed in, unless Hezbollah is attacked and his military wing forcefully dismantled, at which point, the tribunal will not be the party’s first worries. If it was revenge that Hezbollah is seeking, it will unlikely be done in such a careless way. The party has a reputation of being a patient and a very well-calculated actor. By assassinating al-Hassan, Hezbollah was not going to stop neither the STL process nor the flow of arms to the Syrian opposition, but will gain him sectarian tensions within Lebanon and an additional charge added to his file in the STL.

Similar to previous assassinations in Lebanon, this latest one is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. The scenarios presented above are all plausible but their probabilities vary, and they are meant to present a more in depth understanding of the complexity of al-Hassan’s assassination.

The polarization in the Middle East today has never been clearer. The era of détente between the anti-American and Pro-American camps has ended. Diplomacy has taken a back seat and coercion is the name of the game. In instances like this, resourceful and diplomatic figures, such as al-Hassan, are not needed as much and thus become expendable. As the saying goes “only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Bilal Hamade is a graduate student of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Windsor. His work can also be read on his political blog The Anti-Orientalist

Featured on Al Jazeera World, filmmakers Mariam Shahin and George Azar chart the deterioration of the Israeli-Turkish relationship. Once part of the United States’ strategic alliance in the Middle East, new realities within the region are forcing these competing powers to clearly define and prioritize their self-interests from their mutual interests. The documentary also looks into the impact of recently discovered gas deposits on the future of this once key strategic alliance.

To read more of about the history of Israeli-Turkish relations and their loose grouping under the periphery policy, click here.

The Promised Land

Formerly named Transjordan, the British administered principality was part of the promise offered to the Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, through the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon. The popular correspondence between the two was the basis of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks during the Great War. Hussein’s reward for joining the allied effort was the title “king of the Arabs,” establishing his dominion over liberated Arabia. Unfortunately for Hussein the British promise was not exclusive. Ironically, he not only lost the Arab throne, but his own kingdom as well, to another British ally; Abdul-Aziz bin Saud.

In light of this diplomatic disaster, Briton gifted the Transjordan and Syria to Hussein’s (the Hashemite family) two sons. However, another set of secret discussions regarding the future of the Middle East with France forced the Syrian king to be transferred to serve in Iraq.  Hashemite rule in Iraq was brought to a bloody end in 1958, leaving Jordan the last remnants of Hussein’s promise.

Land of Refugees

With the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948, the Jewish state of Israel was established on the British mandate of Palestine. While Jewish forces were capable of capturing most of the land included in the mandate, the West Bank (which included the East Jerusalem and the Old City) stayed in Arab hands and was administered by Jordan for almost two decades. At the same time, Jordan like many of the neighboring Arab states became home to many Arab Palestinians. During this time, Jordan became the first Arab state to conduct secret negotiations with Israel, building towards some form of détente. However, King Hussein of Jordan was forced to join a military alliance with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, who saw him as a Western puppet (Also, Nasser having overthrown the King of Egypt, was not fond of monarchs and called for revolutions to depose them). Hussein’s need for legitimacy and his fear of Nasser’s influence over his people, pushed Jordan to join the strategic alliance against Israel.

Then came the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel captured the Gaza strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank from Jordan. The blitz not only left the Arab forces in tatters, but created a new refugee crisis with thousands leaving Israel’s spoils of war. The refugee influx was mostly felt by Jordan who suddenly found their native population overtaken by Palestinian Arabs. In light of this, Jordan became the only state in the region to give Palestinians an opportunity to become citizens, an act of survival that was criticized by Palestinian and Arab groups for impairing efforts establishing a Palestinian national identity.

Palestinians became a part of the Jordanian fabric but were still treated as a security threat and discriminated against. Jordan’s Palestinian problem came to a head in 1970 when Palestinian militants, who had used Jordan to launch cross border raids into Israel, attempted to overthrow the Hashemite regime. Once King Hussein regained his hold on power, the militants were granted passage through Syria and settled in Lebanon where they continued their attacks on Israel (leading to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon 1978).

A New Stream of Refugees

Jordan’s next flux of refugees came with the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2002, as thousands fled sectarian violence and terrorism. Jordan and Syria were popular destinations with the former providing haven for Iraqi Sunni Muslims who no longer had the protection afforded to their minority by deposed President Saddam Hussein. Almost a decade later, Iraq’s stability remains fragile and as its Shia-led government bends further towards its supporters in Iran, Jordan might become a permanent home for thousands of Iraqis.

Today, Jordan’s fate like the rest of the Middle East seems intertwined with the conflict in Syria. Already, thousands have crossed over into Northern parts of the country and been relocated into specially designated refugee camps. There have even been a few scuffles between Syrian and Jordanian borders troops to further add fire to this precarious situation. As Syria descends further into the realms of civil war, Jordan’s borders might become a transfer zone for refugees, fighters and weapons. Apart from Turkey, which itself has taken an active role in assisting anti-Assad forces and housing refugees in the north of Syria, Jordan remains the only other Sunni point of entry for what has become a regional conflict between Shia and Sunni states. Jordan has already expressed concerns regarding their capacity to house and safeguard the thousands that have crossed over. With no end in sight, this Syrian influx might be the straw that breaks this camel’s back.

Despite the best efforts of the Hashemite regime in creating a sense of calmness and stability in a region that lacks both, Jordan’s future seems destined to be shaped and imperilled by all those around them; by anyone but themselves.

This past week’s decapitating strike by Syrian opposition forces resulted in the deaths of Defense Minister Dawood Rajiha, his “deputy” Asef Shawkat (Assad’s brother-in law), Assistant Vice President Hassan Turkmani and Hisham Ikhtiar (Syria’s National Security Chief). The brazen bombing showed that the situation in Syria has recently deteriorated much quicker than many expected; the ability of the ever emboldened opposition to strike at the higher echelons of the Syrian regime is becoming a potential game changer. As the situation continues to spiral out of control, reports of ethnic cleansing of neighbourhoods and villages to the driving out of Iraqi refuges are raising sectarian tensions.

With pundits all agreeing that it is not a matter of “if” the Assad regime will fall but rather “when,” attention needs to be paid to what the aftermath of his fall might be. Syria is a divided nation in a divided region, where the majority Sunni population has been repressed at the hands of the Alawites (Shiites). Meanwhile the Kurds of Syria much like Kurds in Iraq and Turkey has suffered years of repression that has led to various nationalistic movements within the group. Smattered between these major groups are enclaves of Druze and Christians who are positioned to be potential targets of reprisal for their years of supporting the Assad regime.

Looking at a map of Syria, you can certainly identify geographic areas that are the likely strongholds of the various sectarian groups and where they can take hold. As the regimes’ control continues to weaken over vast tracks of the countryside the power of these sectarian groups will continue to grow, which could result in the Balkanization and breakup of Syria. Of course, a post-civil war federal arrangement could be struck in Syria, but unlike Iraq (the only other federal state in the region) there are not vast sums of oil wealth that can be redistributed to placate the various groups. This of course raises the question of what will be the glue that binds Syria together. With no clear answer to this question and the presence of numerous groups that have a lot to gain by breaking up Syria, it is a scenario that leaves much to be considered.

For Sunni Muslims, the opportunity for self-governance, to rule their own country, has been a long time coming. Making up a clear majority of Syria’s current population, any democratic system of government would ensure Sunni dominance (depending on the political parties and potential vote splitting). Sunni’s have long been shut out of higher levels of governments and leadership positions by the Assad regime so it would likely result in key government posts changing over, along with the patronage and corruption networks that accompany them.  Arguably the Sunni’s have the most to gain by holding Syria together but in order to do so they will likely have to make numerous concessions to the other sectarian groups.

If the Sunni have the most to gain, the Alawites have the most to lose. This thirteen or so percent of the Syrian population has controlled the country for decades and from the commanding heights of government, the webs of patronage spread lining the pockets of many in this community. For years, Alawites loyal to Assad ran the security services and were responsible for countless crimes against their fellow Syrians and as a result, the risk of reprisal is quite high. Geographically, the Alawites are concentrated along the Mediterranean coast, which is shared with the majority of Syria’s Christian population. What could result is the formation of a “new-Lebanon” where an Alawite-Christian bargain could be struck for their mutual protection from a vengeful Sunni majority. This new nation would likely find friends (and possible patrons) in both Iran and Lebanon (particularly Hezbollah) as their common Shiite perspectives and existing relationships from the current regime could carry over.

As for the Kurds, the possibility of a disintegrating Syria brings hope to the nationalist groups (both in and outside Syria) who have long fought against not only the Syrian regime but Saddam in Iraq and Turkey to the north. It is unlikely that the Syrian Kurds would settle for any arrangement short of their own autonomous region within the state (much like their neighbours in Iraq). In fact, Syrian Kurds have already gone so far as to boldly declare the independence of West Kurdistan, with the city of Afrin as the capital. Although no official recognition has come for this new Kurdish “state,” the fact that plans are already in place for it point towards its formation when Assad finally falls. Unfortunately for the Kurds, their enclaves are nestled along the Turkish border, and Turkey has been quite clear in the past that it would not accept an independent Kurdish state as it would undermine its own territorial integrity.

Neither the Druze nor Christians of Syria have the population or geographic concentration to form a viable successor state on their own. As already noted, the Christians are concentrated in the North, mixed into Alawite areas near the Mediterranean between Lebanon and Turkey. Their state would require some sort of arrangement with the Alawites. Meanwhile, the Druze live predominately in areas South of Damascus, sandwiched along the border regions of Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. A Druze state would likely be made up with Sunni Muslims and as a result, there is a question of whether the Sunnis of the region would be willing partners in this venture as they have much to gain in a post-Assad Sunni dominated Syria.

For Syria’s neighbours, the disintegration of the country is, for the most part, not the desired outcome of this conflict. The question is, what can they do? Unfortunately for them, without some direct intervention, there isn’t much they can do. As already mentioned, Turkey is worried about the impact over its own Kurdish population if a new Kurdish state is established in Syria. For Lebanon, a country already divided on sectarian lines, the disintegration of Syria could be a mixed blessing. For decades, Syria has interfered with the internal politics and processes within Lebanon. However, the process of this messy divorce in Syria already shows signs of spilling over the border into the streets of Lebanon. For Israel, the end of Assad means dealing with the unknown, which is something the Israelis prefer not to do.  Although they have no love for Assad’s Syria, the Israelis fear who or what could replace the regime and there are also more immediate concerns regarding Assad’s chemical weapon stockpiles. That being said, the end of Syria proper could solve some of Israel’s problems by ending patronage for Hezbollah; the alliance with Iran; possibly allowing Israel to formally claim the occupied Golan Heights; and potentially a non-Muslim (Druze) state on its border. For Jordan and Iraq, the collapse of the Shiite control in Syria could result in a friendly Sunni state in Damascus and end the Syria-Iranian Axis but it comes at the risk of both fighting and refugees spilling over their boarders.

Regardless how the conflict within Syria proceeds, it is quite clear that it will have a dramatic outcome for the Middle East. If Syria remains a unified nation (an outcome that is not certain by any means) it will likely look and act dramatically different from the current model. If Syria as we know it currently comes to an end and breaks up into several smaller sectarian states, it will likely usher in a new period of instability and turmoil for the Middle East. Pandora ’s Box has opened and the contents can’t be returned, pundits and politicians are in agreement that Assad’s reign is, one way or another, finished; the only question is what will happen once he is gone.

Frazier Fathers is a graduate student of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Windsor as well as a Master’s of Public Policy student at the University of Michigan. His interests include Canadian Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, and he obtained his undergraduate degree in Political Science and Economics at the Wilfred Laurier University.

Popular political scientist John Mearsheimer and former Pentagon official Dov Zakheim argue about the merits and risks of Iran possessing nuclear weapons and its influence on Middle Eastern stability. The debate over the purpose of nuclear weapons has been reignited in recent weeks by Kenneth Waltz’s piece on the Foreign Policy Magazine, where he argues that Iranian nuclear weapons would bring stability to the region. Waltz’s article can be found here.

India and China share similar histories; both were liberated from imperialist rule in the mid-1940s and both have experienced a period of economic prosperity since the late 20^th Century. However, one core difference between the two nations will allow China to continue to prosper while causing India’s economic performance to stagnate: their governments. On paper, India’s democracy seems much more enlightened than China’s one-party Communist state. In fact, many would agree that it is. However, while India’s model has allowed for better civil and human rights, its democracy is holding the nation back from the economic prosperity attained by China. And while democracy has allowed the West to undergo rapid economic development in the 19^th and 20^th Centuries, the democratic model cannot be effectively emulated in India for a few reasons.

            Firstly, a great portion of India’s population is unfit to vote, particularly in rural areas. In many rural areas, the majority of citizens are illiterate and uneducated. Therefore, they are more susceptible to bribes for votes and advertising campaigns. After all, villagers in rural India lack facilities such as the Internet and other means of assessing a politician’s qualifications and comparing it to that of other candidates. As a result, many villagers will vote for any candidate whose name or advertisements they have heard or whose bribes they have accepted. Consequently, due to India’s uniformed populace, voting often results in the election of unqualified politicians who do not have the nation’s economic interests at heart.

Corruption in India is a separate but related issue. India’s uneducated populace often unknowingly elects corrupt leaders. A Transparency International report estimates that 50% of public officials in India have had first hand experience with corruption. As a result, India has scored a dismal 3.1 on a scale of 1-10 in the organization’s transparency index. India’s score puts it behind nations such as Sri Lanka, Greece, and Zambia. India’s corruption could be avoided by adopting a one-party political model like China’s in which knowledgeable government officials appoint officials instead of potentially illiterate constituents.

Furthermore, India’s democracy leads to stalemates in parliament that halts economic policymaking. India has long affirmed that it is the world’s largest democracy. It is also, however, the world’s largest bureaucracy. In fact, Hong Kong’s Political and Economic Risk Consultancy ranked India’s bureaucracy a 9.21 on a scale of 1-10. India’s score was the worst of any Asian nation. This bureaucracy prevents the nation from passing new legislation to improve economic performance in a dynamic world.

Undeniably, democracy is the best governance system for the majority of nations. However, India faces a unique set of circumstances, including an uneducated populace, bureaucracy, and corruption that render democracy unproductive in the nation. In fact, democracy is holding back India’s full economic potential. If India aspires to become a rising economic superpower such as China, it may have to surrender its democratic values for single-party rule. China’s single-party rule, after all, has freed the nation from bureaucracy, the perils of an uneducated populace, and (to a certain degree) corruption.

Varun Bindra is a tenth grade student at the Singapore American School. Along with a keen interest in current events and politics, Varun’s hobbies include writing, debating, and participating in Model United Nations. You can read more of his political opinions/analysis at his blog www.powerpoliticsblog.wordpress.com

War: Natural and Evolving

The evolution of society and the nation-state have closely followed our advances on the battlefield. From the discovery of fire, to the use iron and the advent of gunpowder, the turns of human history have often been dictated by the success of these new weapons. This rate of advancement has accelerated significantly in the last century alone, where the focus of warfare shifted from the armoured tanks to air superiority to weapons of mass destruction.

In a world ruled by commercial interests, efficiency is vital. This has been translated into the battlefront with the development of more efficient methods of destruction. New ground was broken in the 1991 Gulf War, where American troops leading a vast global coalition, destroyed Iraq’s million-man army and liberated the oil rich principality of Kuwait. This is often termed as the first hi-tech war. Gone were the gruesome images of Vietnam, this was a war for the computer age. In fact, thanks to the use of graphics and aerial images, the Gulf War was viewed like a modern-day video game; a clean war, riding on the success of laser guided missiles. However, the dream didn’t last long. Even as American warplanes were laying waste to retreating Iraqi columns, U.S. President George Bush Sr.’s administration was growing nervous about American perceptions shaped by the charred remains of Iraqi armoured divisions. You can only conceal the blood and the bodies for so long.

The limits to hi-tech warfare soon became apparent after the events in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, a lesson that was reiterated in Afghanistan and Iraq. Insurgents and guerrilla tactics became the only means to tackle the advantages afforded to technologically advances armies, much like they did in Vietnam. However, such tactics have bred their own counter-measures that are challenging military strategists, politicians and the public at large. This new phase of hi-tech warfare could render many conventions of the past useless. Advances like use of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles to survey, track and destroy enemy targets has raised plenty of moral questions. They have provided states with low-cost means to dispose of hard to reach targets, similar to the use of proxy terror organizations to hit targets deep within enemy lines without putting “our soldiers” in harms way. Still, the images and tales of wedding parties becoming collateral damage has pulled on the conscience of some, reminding that war is never clean nor efficient.

However, one particular advancement has, at least for the time being, taken bodies out of the equation, so much so that some analysts are reluctant to use the word “war.”

Everything’s Going Online

Cyber warfare is either the latest platform for inter-state conflict or a gimmick that doesn’t fit the conventional definition for warfare. It may sound like the stuff of movies and spy novels, but the Internet has becoming an avenue for ‘violent’ political action. The actors include state agencies, patriotic groups (supported or encouraged by states), non-state actors and transnational actors, all creating the same sense of chaotic order that exists in the real world of politics.

The potential for cyber warfare has expanded with our growing reliance on technology. And while some question its intentions and utility, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) recently passed at the U.S. House of Representatives is an indication of the concept’s growing support base. CISPA’s proponents have often cited the act as a necessary piece of legislation to defend America and her interests against Russian and Chinese cyber attacks.

There have always been rumours of China and Russia fielding hundreds of computer hackers in secret facilities. Video game Company Electronic Arts even added them into their popular Real-time strategy game Command & Conquer: Generals, where Chinese armies field computer hackers along side tanks and MiG fighters. There have already been “cyber wars” between patriotic hackers, like the 2010 incident involving Iran and China. In such cases it is difficult to decipher the level of government complicity. It is quite possible that these young keyboard warriors might become a future form of state sponsored proxy terrorists.

Beyond Cyberspace

However, there is a difference between shutting down the White House’ website or YouTube to cyber attacks that can make waves outside the World Wide Web. According to U. S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, a crippling attack that could shut down power grids or financial institutions could be classified as an act of war. While there have been very few cyber attacks that could be classified under this definition, the two most successful cases involve Israeli/American cyber attacks on Iran’s nuclear program.

In 2010, a complex computer virus called Stuxnet severely dented Iran’s nuclear progress. Some estimated that the damage was so significant that it set back the program six months; it even bought about a lull in rhetoric coming from the Israeli Prime Minister’s office. The most recent virus named “Flame” has infiltrated users across the Middle East, making their webcams and microphones into spying devices. In both cases, experts concluded that the technology was too advanced for basement hackers and must have involved state resources. Reports also stated that both programs were created by the same parties with possible Israeli and American cooperation. With Panetta’s definition, it could be argued that Israel and America have already engaged Iran in an act of war.

Given the Wild West nature of the Internet, threats can emanate from a variety of sources. States like India that have a strong technology sector that has helped develop both cyber defensive and offensive capabilities to counter the threats they face from states like Pakistan and China. Iran has also invested in mastering various tools of cyber warfare and their capture of the hi-tech U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone may have been their crowning achievement. Research on China’s capabilities show a deep technical, strategic and even philosophical perspective on cyber warfare, often referencing Sun Tzu’s work to interpret the use of cyber warfare. A former senior Colonel of the People’s Liberation Army and cyber warfare strategist, Wang Baocun wrote in the mid-90s that cyber warfare strategy reinforces the notion of Sun Tzu’s “subduing the enemy without battle.” If China’s cyber strategy has continued to evolve since then, perhaps it truly is the formidable bogey man everyone suspects it of being.

Battles without Blood and Bodies

Organizations and governments all over the world agree that there has been a significant increase in cyber attacks. The United Kingdom’s security service MI5 has stated that they have been battling an “astonishing” number of cyber attacks, of which many might be duds. There are two unique characteristics that makes cyber warfare a double edged sword when predicting the future relations between states.

As war is always likely to exist as state interests continue to collide and conflict with each other, cyber warfare provides a safe, easy and bloodless option. However, the reason why states don’t rush into war because of every act violating their sovereignty is due to a cost/benefit analysis. War is expensive, monetarily and politically, and these costs often don’t justify the predicted or actual rewards. Therefore, if the cost of warfare was significantly reduced on all fronts, would it make states more likely to pursue it as a course of action?

Another issue is anonymity. Today, most cyber attacks are carried out by non-state actors like the hacktivist groups Anonymous and LulzSec. As seen with the 2010, Iran-China affair, it would be very simple for a state to recruit gifted programmers to attack foreign sites under the guise of hacktivism or individual action. One factor that was used to distinguish Stuxnet from a basement built program was its complexity, however, with the rise of competence in computer programming and the growing presence of gifted individuals not under a state’ payroll, it is not implausible to suggest that independent groups or individuals could create programs that can devastate state owned websites or knock-out a power grid.

Then there is the question of targeting civilians, a criterion of war that while not always followed, is accepted by all. State sponsored Cyber attacks that target power facilities, financial institutions, traffic or air traffic control systems are all targeting civilians. The consequences are similar to those of sanctions designed to target hostile or tyrannical regimes, actions that only affect civilian life. Even a minor attack that shuts down a popular website could be interpreted as an act against non-military personnel, particularly as the most effective cyber attacks will be against states that have strong information infrastructure that is intertwined with day-to-day life.

Therefore, the question remains whether a world of bloodless war, promises less inter-state conflict. Despite all we know, the concept of Cyber Warfare has not yet been fully realized. With the increase in national budgets supporting cyber security and intelligence, it is safe to say that the concept is not just a passing fancy. It may very well be the future of war, although its shape and utility remains unknown. Will states use this new platform as a proxy tool as many did with terrorism? Or will they draw clear, distinctive lines to define new rules of engagement for a new form of warfare?

Although it came as a shock to many, the idea that Iceland – one of the hardest hit nations by the 2008 financial crisis – would call for adopting the Loonie, presents Canada with a unique opportunity in the 21^st century.

Following the collapse of the Icelandic economy, the Icelandic krona lost 60% of its value and the government was forced to place strict restrictions on currency exchange to prevent a flood of currency leaving the nation. Numerous options have been floated to solve the Icelandic currency dilemma and amongst these, the Canadian dollar carries some attractive features. Firstly, and most importantly from an economic standpoint, is that both Canada and Iceland share similar business cycles with their resource based export economies. Second, the current and ongoing struggles within the European Union and the questions of its future stability means that despite the ongoing ascension negotiations, the Euro may not be the best option for the Icelandic economy. Even the mighty US dollar faces a number of other serious concerns considering the political deadlock that grips Washington. Their economy that has been stuck in a rut since the 2008 recession and with the massive debt burden carried by the world’s last superpower, the once mighty greenback seems like less of an attractive option.

From the standpoint of Canadian interests in allowing Iceland to adopt the Loonie, it holds very few drawbacks. The Icelandic economy is only a fraction of the size of Canada’s ($14 Billion vs 1.8 Trillion), so the negative impacts for Canada would likely be minimal beyond an increased demand for Canadian dollars, which would likely drive up its value. The Bank of Canada (BoC) would profit from the sale of Canadian dollars to Iceland, and as a result those funds can be added to the approximate 1.7 billion that the BoC adds to government coffers.

The overall result of adopting the Loonie would in essence drive Canada and Iceland closer together beyond the realm of finance and lead to greater future integration.  Canadians would be more likely to travel to Iceland (and vice versa) due to the parity of costs and the sizable Icelandic population (surprisingly many settled in Manitoba of all places) could directly assist their families back home by sending them currency of substantial value on the international stage. Canada already holds a free trade agreement with Iceland and the adoption of a common currency would see trade between the two countries increase as the ease of transactions between countries would be reduced resulting in trade growth – expanding beyond the 52 million dollars in annual exports that Canada sends to Iceland. It is likely that even politically, areas of common concern (such as issues before the Arctic Council or fisheries) would see improved cooperation and coordination.

This new Canada-Icelandic relationship in turn would leave one arctic neighbour out in the cold, Greenland. Having in a 2008 referendum voted for additional powers of self-government away from Denmark, this arctic county, which yet again shares a similar economic cycle to that of Canada (natural resource based), has gained increasing control over the income from these natural resources. Currently, Denmark has not joined the Euro zone (which has partially spared it from some of the groups’ financial issues) but Greenland has recently begun discussions about introducing its own currency and leaving the Danish krone. This past May, Icelandic economists speaking on Bay Street on the topic of the Canadian dollar were quoted as saying that if Iceland adopted the Canadian dollar, Greenland would follow. Canada currently only exports approximately 14 million dollars to Greenland, but sharing a common currency would likely drive up that amount up and reorient Greenland away from its traditional European trade partners, which are carryovers from its time as a Danish protectorate.

So the question becomes, in this time of economic austerity and poor growth, why isn’t Canada aggressively pursuing this option? True it may not make a dramatic change in the day to day lives of most Canadians, but there really isn’t a major downside for Canada in actively pursuing these nations into joining the Canadian dollar. The Government of Canada has many carrots to offer these countries such as a seat on the Bank of Canada Board of Governors (equal standing with each province) where they would have a voice on monetary policy yet not the ability to overrule the broad Canadian consensus.

The wider integration that would follow the adoption of the Canadian dollar would be well worth the effort. Having three arctic nations united under a single currency would boast Canada’s standing on the Arctic Council, which could then be used to provide support for Canada’s claims in the region. Having the Canadian dollar the valid currency for over 12.1 million square kilometres of the earth surface is definitely worth something; especially when large portions of this area will be the final frontier of economic development in the 21^st century due climate change.

Frazier Fathers is a graduate student of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Windsor as well as a Master’s of Public Policy student at the University of Michigan. His interests include Canadian Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, and he obtained his undergraduate degree in Political Science and Economics at the Wilfred Laurier University.