As many speculate over the future of Syria, filmmaker Suhaib Abu Doulah explores its turbulent past. From the days of the United Arab Republic to the military coup that elevated Hafez Al-Assad to the Presidency, this documentary provides a deeper look at the political culture and past experiences that have shaped a divided nation.
In the midst of the chaos that defines Middle Eastern politics to the outside world, Jordan seems to be strange anomaly. Since its post-World War II establishment, the principality has gone through little change and comparatively lacked the tumultuous turns and revolutions that have forged their neighbors. However, in a region where every bomb blast and rocket fired causes a ripple effect, Jordan has not been immune to the pressures outside their borders. Today, the state is bearing the brunt of a refugee crisis stemming from the conflict in Syria, a role it has grown accustomed to playing since its’ inception.
By Frazier Fathers
This past week’s decapitating strike by Syrian opposition forces resulted in the deaths of Defense Minister Dawood Rajiha, his “deputy” Asef Shawkat (Assad’s brother-in law), Assistant Vice President Hassan Turkmani and Hisham Ikhtiar (Syria’s National Security Chief). The brazen bombing showed that the situation in Syria has recently deteriorated much quicker than many expected; the ability of the ever emboldened opposition to strike at the higher echelons of the Syrian regime is becoming a potential game changer. As the situation continues to spiral out of control, reports of ethnic cleansing of neighbourhoods and villages to the driving out of Iraqi refuges are raising sectarian tensions.
With pundits all agreeing that it is not a matter of “if” the Assad regime will fall but rather “when,” attention needs to be paid to what the aftermath of his fall might be. Syria is a divided nation in a divided region, where the majority Sunni population has been repressed at the hands of the Alawites (Shiites). Meanwhile the Kurds of Syria much like Kurds in Iraq and Turkey has suffered years of repression that has led to various nationalistic movements within the group. Smattered between these major groups are enclaves of Druze and Christians who are positioned to be potential targets of reprisal for their years of supporting the Assad regime.
It is hard to believe that the violence in Syria has gone unabated for over a year. When the Arab Spring first took hold of the Maghreb and parts of the Gulf, Syria was a late arrival. Former President Hafez Al-Assad had laid down a brutal precedent by crushing the 1982 revolt in Hama that some analysts predicted against a Syrian uprising in the birth place of Arab nationalism. However, with the fall of Egyptian stalwart Hosni Mubarak, Syrians came onto the streets, not chanting for revolution but reform. Unfortunately, Hafez’ son, Bashar Al-Assad, took a page from his father’s handbook; the chants were met with bullets and country has been descending down the path of civil war since. Diplomatic efforts at every level – state, regional and international – have failed to string together periods of peace, let alone halt the violence and there is real danger that Syria’s boundaries will be unable to contain the conflict.
By Uri Marantz
Iran. The country is without a doubt one of the most geopolitically sensitive states in the international system. It is also one of the most challenging and chimerical countries for its immediate neighbours, the region’s rising powers, the world’s great powers and the international community as a whole to fathom. Just this past weekend (April 14, 2012), the first nuclear talks between the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council – China, France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S. – and Germany) and Iran in 15 months took place. During the past decade, subsequent rounds of these talks have led to little or no progress. The most recent talks in Istanbul have been hailed by the Americans, Europeans and Iranians as ‘constructive and useful’, although nothing of substance was actually achieved at these negotiations. If the universally positive atmosphere emanating from Istanbul lasts for another month, the real negotiations on Iranian uranium enrichment and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections will begin in earnest on May 23 in Baghdad.
By Uri Marantz
Of all the intergovernmental regional groupings, the Arab League is most likely the least effective. Since the organization was founded in 1945, the League of Arab States has skillfully steered clear of taking any decisive action on virtually every international conflict in the region. Except for the Arab-Israeli conflict, on which popular opinion in every member-state remains extremely pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli for obvious reasons, the Arab League has sought to avoid any divisive action within the Arab community. The League even managed to sit out the ‘Arab Cold War’ of the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, an international struggle between nationalist republics and Islamist monarchies in the region that paralleled to some degree the bipolar Cold War between the world’s two superpowers. In this sense, the Arab League’s institutional weakness was its strength: irrelevance ensured survival.
Throughout the past decade, we’ve seen consistent spikes in the news coverage over Iran’s nuclear program. Yes, it has been a decade since the “full extent” of Iran’s nuclear program was disclosed to the world by an exiled opposition group known as National Council of Resistance of Iran. Tens years later, the truth about Iran’s nuclear program still remains opinionated. Currently, there’s a suggestion that neoconservatives and their media machine are pushing U.S. President Barak Obama’s administration to act against Iran before it’s too late. On the other hand, Obama seems determined to stay put and ensure Israel is restrained from launching a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. What is less discussed are the political risks Iran and Israel face in pursuing what many see as their national interests. In other words, would a nuclear weapon really be beneficial for the Islamic Republic? Would the consequences of an Israeli strike improve its security and safeguard its future?
Perhaps it is all a coincidence; the attacks on Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia and a failed bomb plot in Thailand by Iranian nationals. Add to this the tensions between Iran, Israel and the West, the presence of the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Straits of Hormuz and Iran’s latest nuclear advancements, perhaps it’s not a coincidence at all.
The past few weeks have seen a rapid escalation in rhetoric and action between Iran and the U.S. lead Western alliance. The latter is hoping to contain Iran’s nuclear progress through the use of sanctions and political pressure. Iran’s response, particularly their threat to close off the Straits of Hormuz, has many commentators believing that Western sanctions are starting to bite.
Despite such grave threats by a regime known for its mastery of vitriolic rhetoric, the Islamic Republic of Iran has rarely confronted their adversaries directly. Iran’s preference has always been to use its various proxies to inflict damage at a low cost to itself. This is true mostly with regards to its regional competitor Israel. Through groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, Iran has been able to punish Israel indirectly with little cost. Some cite the recent attacks as responses to suspected Israeli assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. The most recent attacks also coincided with the anniversary of Israel’s assassination of former Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah, which would strengthen the case that these attacks were carried out with some level of Iranian compliance. Hezbollah for their part deny any involvement. If Tehran is ruled as the perpetrator, it would not be the first time the regime has targeted Israeli interests abroad; the most popular case being the Israeli embassy bombings in Argentina.
The battle for Syria is raging on the streets of Homs. Last week, it was fought in the halls of the United Nations, where international consensus was outmanoeuvred by Russian and Chinese vetoes. Since then, there has been much discussion regarding the interests of these key players and how they factor into the future of Syria. The situation was perfectly captured by Al Jazeera guest Sergei Strokan; Syria’s future has become a “hostage to geopolitical gain.” Discounting International players like Russia and the United States, the Syrian conundrum remains a complex regional game of chess.
